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INVESTMENT ARBITRATION UNDER 
NAFTA CHAPTER 11: 
A THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY OF 
MEMBER STATES? 
Congressman William L. Owens (NY-21)* 
assisted by R. Andrew Fitzpatrick** 
ABSTRACT: Critics of NAFTA Chapter 11’s investor state dispute settlement mechanism are 
primarily concerned with its invocation by corporate entities and its potential to effectively 
overturn or significantly weaken NAFTA states’ ability to legislate or regulate in the public 
interest. This article will address this central concern and demonstrate, by evaluating Chapter 
11 arbitration results, that these criticisms have been over-stated. While developing nations 
like Mexico are undoubtedly conflicted in their willingness to accept ISDS agreements, 
participation by all three NAFTA countries in this mechanism can lessen the political risk for 
foreign investment and attract much-needed outside capital in order to spur economic activity. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Cross-border investment liberalization is a central goal of the twenty-year-
old North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).1 In pursuit of this goal, 
NAFTA includes a number of provisions designed to protect foreign investors 
from discrimination by host states and to facilitate the settlement of international 
investment disputes. These investment provisions include some of NAFTA’s 
most contentious features, the investor protection standards and investor-state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism found in Chapter 11 of the agreement.2 
The proposed inclusion of similar provisions in new, multilateral trade 
agreements including the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Canada-EU Trade 
Agreement (CETA), and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(T-TIP), makes an analysis of the impact of these provisions timely. By assessing 
the performance of NAFTA investor-state arbitration tribunals to date, this article 
will demonstrate that though weaknesses deserving of reform exist, Chapter 11’s 
 
* Congressman William L. Owens has represented New York’s 21st Congressional District 
since November of 2009. Before being elected to Congress in a special election to fill the 
vacancy created by former-Rep. John McHugh’s appointment to Secretary of the Army, Bill 
had never run for public office. Now, as the Representative for the second largest 
congressional district east of the Mississippi, Bill is working with his colleagues on both sides 
of the aisle to help create jobs and economic opportunity for hardworking New York families. 
** Legislative Director for Congressman William L. Owens (NY-21), Washington D.C. 
 1 North American Free Trade Agreement, Can-Mex-U.S., art. 1105, Dec 17, 1992, 32 
I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
 2 Id. 
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ISDS mechanism is a necessary tool of investor protection and has not eroded the 
power of sovereign states to regulate in the public interest. 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11 aims to create a fair and predictable framework to 
allow for expanded flows of cross-border investment, which in turn can generate 
greater economic growth across North America.3 Improving the efficiency of 
capital allocation is meant to enable each signatory nation to benefit from the 
corresponding growth in cross-border investment associated with freer trade in 
goods and services.4 “Since NAFTA came into force in 1994, foreign direct 
investment in North America has risen from $110 billion per year in 1992 to 
$650 billion per year in 2010, a 490% increase.”5 
In basic terms, Chapter 11 outlines investor protection principles based on 
international reciprocity and equitable treatment, and sets up an arbitration 
process to address the breach of these obligations by a signatory country.6 This 
dispute settlement mechanism provides foreign investors with the authority to 
proceed directly against a NAFTA government7, a standing that represents a 
meaningful departure from past practice when such disputes were traditionally 
handled between national governments.8 By empowering an investor to directly 
challenge a NAFTA government, the investor’s grievances are theoretically less 
politicized, and adjudicated more impartially than they would be through state-
to-state negotiation.9 
Critics of Chapter 11 are primarily concerned with the use of this power by 
corporate entities and its potential to effectively overturn or significantly weaken 
NAFTA states’ ability to legislate or regulate in the public interest, according to 
their respective constitutional powers and responsibilities. In other words, though 
the narrow interests of investors may be adversely affected by member states’ 
public policies, these private interests should not be able to trump public 
regulation for environmental protection, consumer safety, and other legitimate 
sovereign state actions.10 This potential investor influence goes well beyond that 
 
 3 Julie Soloway with comments by Chris Tollefeson NAFTA’s Chapter 11: Investor 
Protection, Integration, and the Public Interest, 9 INST. FOR RESEARCH ON PUB. POL’Y 4 (2003) 
[hereinafter Soloway & Tollefeson]. 
 4 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1 (listing the objectives of NAFTA including “eliminate 
barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods and services between 
the territories of the Parties” and to “increase substantially investment opportunities in the 
territories of the Parties.”) 
 5 Diana Villiers Negroponte, North American Leaders Meet in Toluca, Mexico: What Can 
We Hope For? BROOKINGS (Feb. 18, 2014 12:00 PM) http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-
front/posts/2014/02/18-north-american-leaders-toluca-negroponte. 
 6 NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1105 and 1115. 
 7 Soloway & Tollefeson, supra note 3 at 4. 
 8 Id. at 3. 
 9 See Soloway & Tollefeson, supra note 3, at 4 (asserting that “empowering a private 
investor to directly challenge a host government depoliticizes in principle the dispute 
settlement process by removing it from the realm of state-to-state diplomatic relations” Id.). 
See also Daniel M. Price, NAFTA Chapter 11 – Investor-State Dispute Settlement: 
Frankenstein or Safety Valve? 26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 107 at 113 (2000) (stating that the intent of 
NAFTA was to depoliticize investor-state disputes by taking them out of the “political realm 
and put them more into the realm of international arbitration.” Id.). 
 10 Id. at 5. 
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contained in the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) regime, which does not 
accord any substantive rights to private parties, whether corporations, NGOs, or 
other non-state actors. This article will address this central concern and 
demonstrate, by evaluating Chapter 11 arbitration results, that these criticisms 
have been over-stated. Rather, Chapter 11 does not employ an entirely new ISDS 
mechanism, its decisions have not resulted in critics’ feared outcomes of 
investors overturning public regulations, and it contains a number of exemptions 
and safeguards that can prevent its abuse in the future. 
I. THE U.S. HISTORY WITH ISDS, AND SOME NOTABLE FEATURES OF 
CHAPTER 11 
The U.S. is not new to ISDS. In fact, the United States has a long history of 
involvement in international investment arbitration, dating as far back as the Jay 
Treaty of 1794, which allowed British investors access to international 
arbitration in awarding compensation for losses they sustained in the United 
States during the Revolutionary War.11 More recently, since 1982, the United 
States has entered into fifty bilateral investment treaties that are currently in 
force and include ISDS provisions.12 During this time, although the United States 
has been sued 17 times under Chapter 11 and other such investment agreements, 
it has never lost a case. Therefore, the United States has yet to encounter a 
situation in which a domestic regulation came under threat by the ruling of an 
investment arbitration panel.13 
Commentators may argue that the U.S. is imposing a double-standard on 
developing nations as its leverage repels challenges to domestic regulations 
while well-resourced, U.S. multinational firms are able to extract gains from less 
powerful developing nations.14 If this is indeed the case, the author of this article 
was not able to identify a body of supportive evidence demonstrating such a 
trend. Within NAFTA, Mexico decided it was in its national interest to accept 
ISDS provisions. While developing nations like Mexico are undoubtedly 
conflicted in their willingness to accept ISDS agreements, participation can 
 
 11 Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., arts. V, 
VII, 8 Stat. 116, 119-20, 122. See also Jennifer A. Heindl, Toward a History of NAFTA’s 
Chapter 11, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 676. 
 12 See “United States Bilateral Investment Treaties,” U.S. DEP. OF STATE, http://www.state.
gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/117402.htm (showing all bilateral investment treaties the United States is a 
party to). See also “Bilateral Investment Treaties and Related Agreements” U.S. DEP. OF 
STATE, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/bit/index.htm (explaining that Unites States’ bilateral 
investment treaties provide investments with six basic benefits, including providing “investors 
from both Parties [with] the right to submit an investment dispute with the treaty partner’s 
government to international arbitration. There is no requirement to use that country’s domestic 
courts.” Id.). 
 13 The Facts on Investor-State Dispute Settlement, Tradewinds: The Official Blog of the 
U.S. Trade Rep. (Mar. 27, 2014) https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/blog
/2014/March/Facts-Investor-State%20Dispute-Settlement-Safeguarding-Public-Interest-
Protecting-Investors. 
 14 See NAFTA Chapter 11 Cases: Bankrupting Democracy, PUBLIC CITIZEN (2001), 
http://www.citizen.org/ documents/ACF186.PDF. 
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lessen the political risk for foreign investment, attracting much-needed outside 
capital in order to spur economic activity.15 Interestingly, the body of evidence 
present in NAFTA’s Chapter 11 cases does not point to a rich-poor country 
divide. Most claims have been made between the United States and Canada 
rather than between the U.S. and Mexico, or between Canada and Mexico. In 
fact, Canada has faced the greatest number of Chapter 11 claims.16 
To date, there have only been 68 Chapter 11 cases in NAFTA’s 20 years of 
existence, amounting to just over four per year on average; the vast majority of 
these cases have either favored the national government or have not reached a 
settlement or resolution. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Claims measured in each year first filed, without double-counting 
consolidated proceedings or including the sole terminated case, Centurion 
Health.17 
 
 
 
As shown above, there is no discernible upward trend in the volume of 
claims made over time, nor does the record demonstrate a greater quantity or 
 
 15 Executive Summary 7th Annual Forum of Developing Country Investment Negotiators, 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (Jakarta, Indonesia Nov. 4-6, 
2013) http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2013/7th_annual_ forum_report.pdf. 
 16 See generally SCOTT SINCLAIR, CAN. CENTRE FOR POLICY ALTERNATIVES, NAFTA 
CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTES TO JANUARY 1, 2015 (2015) [hereinafter SINCLAIR]. 
See also Sunny Freeman, NAFTA’s Chapter 11 Makes Canada Most-Sued Country Under 
Free Trade Tribunals, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 14, 2015) (Summarizing the previously cited 
survey, and quoting the author of the study, “Thanks to NAFTA chapter 11, Canada has now 
been sued more times through investor-state dispute settlement than any other developed 
country in the world.”). 
 17 See generally SINCLAIR, id. See also PUBLIC CITIZEN, TABLE OF FOREIGN INVESTOR-
STATE CASES AND CLAIMS UNDER NAFTA AND OTHER U.S. “TRADE” DEALS (2015). 
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scope of decisions reached. Simply put, nothing approaching the worst-case 
scenarios articulated by ISDS critics of proliferating corporate suits, or harmful 
anti-sovereignty, anti-democratic or anti-public interest decisions, have occurred. 
In examining the outcomes of each of these cases in order to assess the 
overall impact of Chapter 11, it is important to keep several points in mind. First, 
a distinction should be made between the arguments of claimants and the actual 
findings of arbitration tribunals. Though some investors under Chapter 11 have 
made bold, broad claims, the actual findings of the tribunals have been much 
narrower in scope. In total, while approximately $55 billion in damages have 
been sought by Chapter 11 claims, only $430.4 million in damages sought have 
been awarded and paid to foreign investors.18 Of all eighty-six claims that have 
been filed under the NAFTA to date, 21 cases (24.4%) were dismissed or won by 
governments, 14 cases (16.2%) were won by investors or resulted in settlements 
in favor of investors, and the remaining cases (59.3%) are pending or have yet to 
be concluded.19 
For example, although much has been made recently of US-based Eli Lilly’s 
$500 million claim20 against the Canadian government over the invalidation of 
Lilly’s drug patents, no arbitration decision has been issued. In essence, Lilly 
claims that the invalidation is tantamount to expropriation, among other violated 
protections under Chapter 11.21 Though a dramatic claim, Lilly’s suit remains 
just that, a claim. This case will be summarized in greater detail later in the 
article. In alleged expropriation cases such as that one, investors have lost far 
more often than they have won against NAFTA member governments, despite 
making ambitious claims. 
The second notable feature of Chapter 11 cases is that tribunal decisions do 
not establish precedent under international law. It may be naïve to think that 
tribunals never consider previous decisions, but the decisions made by one 
Chapter 11 tribunal nonetheless cannot explicitly be used to guide or influence 
future decisions.22 This feature limits the extent to which arbitration tribunals can 
begin veering in one direction or another in terms of decisions biased towards 
investors or nation states. The same principles of investor protection must apply 
in the same ways in each and every case that faces a NAFTA Chapter 11 
arbitration tribunal. 
Third, there continues to be ample evidence that a large majority of investor-
state disputes are successfully adjudicated through the use of historic domestic 
venues. That is, in most cases, investment disputes are settled within a domestic 
court system without the need to resort to a Chapter 11 filing. At this point in 
time, it appears that Chapter 11 cases rightly represent an exception to the norm. 
If, over time, it becomes apparent that investors immediately move to file suit 
 
 18 PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 14. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Eli Lilly v. Canada, UNCT/14/2 (2013) [hereinafter Eli Lilly]. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1136 (providing that “an award made by a Tribunal 
shall have no binding force except between the disputing parties and in respect of the 
particular case.” Id.). 
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under Chapter 11, this situation should be examined further to determine whether 
this feature of the NAFTA is being misused or abused. 
Last, even in cases where investors successfully challenged the laws or 
regulations of a nation-state, Chapter 11 arbitral tribunals cannot force member 
countries to reverse or dismantle the laws or regulations in question. Nor can 
decisions include an injunction against government action or recommend 
amending the law or regulation at issue. Tribunals can only impose a financial 
penalty for monetary damages, applicable interest, litigation costs, and the 
restitution of property. A tribunal may not order a party to pay punitive 
damages.23 These limits of tribunal influence and legal authority comport with 
the essential principle of sovereignty under international law. More detailed 
information on the parameters of an award can be found in Article 1135 of 
Chapter 11. 
The main investment obligations for treaty parties contained in Chapter 11 
upon which an investor claim may be based are as follows: 
 
(1) National Treatment (Article 1102): A signatory government’s obligation 
to treat other investments or investors from another NAFTA signatory no less 
favorably than domestic investments or investors in similar circumstances.24 
(2) Most-Favored Nation (MFN) treatment (Article 1103): A signatory 
government’s obligation to treat investments or investors from another NAFTA 
signatory no less favorably than any other country.25 
(3) Minimum standard of treatment (Article 1105): A signatory 
government’s obligation to treat investments or investors from another NAFTA 
signatory in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable 
treatment.26 
(4) Expropriation and compensation (Article 1110): The obligation to not 
expropriate, or take measures tantamount to expropriation, the investments of a 
NAFTA signatory investor without adequate compensation.27 
(5) Performance requirements (Article 1106): The obligation to not impose 
certain performance requirements, such as domestic content percentages, in 
connection with an investment.28 
II. A SELECTION OF NOTABLE CHAPTER 11 CASES TO DATE 
The Metalclad29 case, initiated in 1999, demonstrates the value of ISDS in 
NAFTA and its potential value in future agreements. It is also the only case in 
which an investor proved the expropriation of its investment. In Metalclad, a 
California-based hazardous waste disposal corporation’s facility in the Mexican 
 
 23 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1135. 
 24 Id. art. 1102. 
 25 Id. art. 1103. 
 26 Id. art. 1105. 
 27 Id. art. 1110. 
 28 Id. art. 1106. 
 29 Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1, ¶ 107 
(2001). 
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State of San Luis Potosi was effectively shuttered by municipal and state 
government actions.30 By refusing to grant operational permits to the company 
based on environmental justifications, Mexico was held to have treated 
Metalclad inequitably, amounting to indirect expropriation.31 
In its finding, the tribunal noted that as a foreign investor, Metalclad had 
appropriately relied on the information provided to it by the Mexican federal 
government, which stated that the municipal construction permits in question 
were not required. As such, as a NAFTA signatory, Mexico failed to live up to 
its treaty obligations, namely the provision of a transparent and predictable 
framework for the planning and investment of an investor from a NAFTA party. 
In the absence of this framework, and due to the clear and intentional prohibition 
of use of the landfill facility, the actions by the local authorities in question were 
ruled tantamount to indirect expropriation. The panel found that a Mexican state 
governor had used a series of bad faith environmental measures in order to block 
the opening of a foreign investor’s site, despite otherwise being compliant with 
all applicable legal standards. Of the $90 million in damages Metalclad had filed 
suit for, the arbitration panel awarded $16.7 million. 
In Mexico’s appeal of the decision to the Supreme Court of British 
Columbia (the jurisdiction where the NAFTA hearing was held), the court 
partially reversed the arbitral award in order to tailor the definition of 
expropriation more narrowly to cases where state interference was proven to be 
intentional and for the state’s benefit.32 This partial reversal, while not rejecting 
the core finding, exemplifies an institutional check on the potentially far-
reaching implications of NAFTA tribunal decisions. The British Columbia court 
decision also reduced the amount of the award by $1.1 million to $15.6 million 
based on a redetermination of the applicable interest rate period.33 
As earlier described, Eli Lilly’s suit against the Government of Canada 
alleges that Canada’s invalidation of its Strattera and Zyprexa pharmaceutical 
patents represents a failure to provide a minimum standard or national treatment, 
and that Canada’s actions have expropriated Lilly’s investments. Canadian 
domestic courts have upheld the invalidation on the basis of the “promise 
doctrine,” which states that in order for an invention to be patentable, not only 
must it be deemed useful for a given purpose, it must also deliver any utility 
promised in the patent specification. 34  While the Canadian government has 
defended this doctrine in claiming that Lilly’s patents no longer meet this 
promised utility, Lilly argues that this standard is not an internationally accepted 
practice and violates Canada’s investment obligations under NAFTA Chapter 11. 
In its most recent Special 301 Report, the U.S. Trade Representative noted 
serious concerns with Canada’s intellectual property policy in the pharmaceutical 
 
 30 Id. at ¶ 29. 
 31 Id. at ¶ 103. 
 32 United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., 2001 B.C.S.C. 664 (B.C.S.C.) (May 2, 2001) 
(Can.). 
 33 Id. 
 34 See, e.g., Eli Lilly, supra note 20; Export Report of Timothy R. Holbrook (Jan. 26, 
2015) (discussing the dispute between Eli Lilly and the Government of Canada over the 
“utility” of Eli Lilly’s patents). 
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sector, singling out the promise doctrine as leading to uncertainty for patent 
holders and disincentives for foreign investors. 35  If a Chapter 11 tribunal 
eventually considers this case, a central question in its proceedings will be the 
extent, if at all, to which Lilly’s treatment can be compared to that of Canadian 
companies. 
In Methanex, 36  a Canadian company with a U.S. subsidiary brought a 
Chapter 11 complaint against the U.S. after an Executive Order was issued to 
remove a gasoline additive known as MBTE. This order was issued in response 
to research by the University of California that demonstrated the harmful effects 
of MBTE leaking from storage tanks in water systems. Methanex, which 
produces methanol, the main component of MBTE, filed a claim arguing that this 
scientific evidence was flawed and that the measure violated Articles 1102 (non-
discrimination) and 1105 (minimum standard of treatment) of Chapter 11, 
respectively.37 However, the tribunal in that case found that there was not a 
“legally significant connection” between the ban on MBTE and the investor. 
Though Methanex was surely affected by the regulation, the scope of regulation 
was viewed as too broad to be the subject of such a challenge as it did not appear 
to target Methanex specifically. In its claim, Methanex attempted to demonstrate 
that the regulation effectively discriminated against its interests relative to a 
comparable domestic investor.38 In the eyes of the tribunal, Methanex had failed 
to do so and, as a consequence, an environmental regulation withstood the 
challenge of a well-resourced foreign investor. 
In Loewen,39 a Canadian funeral home corporation brought a Chapter 11 suit 
against the U.S. government for $725 million, alleging that a Mississippi court 
ruling against it violated U.S. obligations to provide national treatment (1102), 
fair and equitable treatment (1105), and not allow for any actions tantamount to 
expropriation (1110). Though the NAFTA tribunal allowed a foreign investor to 
challenge a domestic court ruling, the tribunal narrowly dismissed the investor 
claim on procedural grounds as the Loewen Corporation had reorganized under 
U.S. bankruptcy laws and, as such, no longer qualified as a foreign investor. 
In 2010, the Canadian Government settled with AbitibiBowater Inc. for $122 
million after the U.S. firm sued for expropriation and compensation under the 
NAFTA’s Chapter 11. 40  AbitibiBowater alleged that the Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador had unlawfully confiscated its timber, water, and 
equipment property after the closure of an AbitibiBowater plant. Newfoundland 
 
 35 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2014 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2014). 
 36 Methanex Corp. v. United States, NAFTA/UNCITRAL (Aug. 3, 2005), 
http://www.state.gov/ documents/organization/51052.pdf 
 37 Methanex Corp. v. United States, Draft Amended Claim, at 3-4 (Feb 12, 2001), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/3940.doc. 
 38 Soloway & Tollefeson, supra note 3. 
 39 The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/98/3 (June 26, 2003), http://www.italaw.com/cases/632. 
 40 AbitibiBowater Inc. v. Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration (23 
April 2009); Canada – Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade Canada Issues Statement on AbitibiBowater Settlement, DFAIT Press 
Release 2010 No. 268 (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/cases/39. 
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and Labrador claimed that these rights were contractually contingent on 
company’s continued operation. While there was no tribunal decision in this 
case, there was also no public policy at stake in this particular matter. 
The consolidated proceedings of three Canadian softwood lumber parties, 
Canfor41, Terminal Forest42, and Tembec43, in 2005 covered $540 million in 
damages sought, caused allegedly by U.S. anti-dumping and countervailing 
duties applied on allegedly subsidized Canadian softwood lumber exports to the 
United States. The case was discontinued when the United States and Canada 
entered into a comprehensive political agreement dealing with lumber subsidies, 
which resolved the overall softwood lumber trade dispute. The 2006 Softwood 
Lumber Agreement (SLA) between the United States and Canada stipulated that 
the United States would lift duties provided that lumber prices stayed above a 
specified range, and below this range, the United States would be authorized to 
impose a mixed export tax and quota regime on imported Canadian lumber. The 
SLA also established a special dispute settlement mechanism for softwood-
related claims before the London Court of International Arbitration. 
In the currently pending CANACAR 44  case, a consortium of Mexican 
trucking companies is suing the United States for blocking Mexican-owned 
carriers from transporting cargo beyond U.S. border states. In 1982, the United 
States passed legislation establishing a moratorium on permits for foreign 
truckers operating in the United States and later lifted the moratorium for 
Canadian truckers. After unmet U.S. assurances in the NAFTA negotiation to 
phase-out the prohibition against the Mexican truckers, in 2001 a five-member 
panel unanimously concluded, in a Chapter 20 party-to-party dispute resolution 
mechanism, that the United States was in violation of the national treatment and 
MFN obligations under Chapter 11. In filing a new claim under Chapter 11, 
CANACAR alleges that the United States has not implemented the tribunal’s 
2001 decision and that U.S. regulations violate the non-discrimination, MFN, 
and “fair and equitable treatment” investor protections under the NAFTA, which 
has resulted in $30 billion in damages, the largest claim made to date. The 
United States has continued to state that safety concerns remain paramount in 
denying operating permits to Mexican trucking firms. However, CANACAR 
argues that its companies have already made significant investments to raise the 
fleet standards to those comparable with American fleets, and that this measure is 
designed to protect American truckers from less expensive foreign labor. As of 
the publication of this article, this case had not been resolved. 
Seeking to protect a de facto monopoly, the Detroit International Bridge 
Company, a U.S.-based corporation which owns and operates the only bridge 
that connects Detroit, Michigan to Windsor, Ontario, sued the Canadian 
government for $3.5 billion in 2010 in protest of the government’s plans to build 
 
 41 Canfor v. United States, Decision on Preliminary Question (June 6, 2006) and Joint 
Order on the Costs of Arbitration and for the Termination of Certain Arbitral Proceedings 
(July 19, 2007), http://www.italaw.com/ cases/200. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 CANACAR v. United States, http://www.italaw.com/cases/3443. 
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a second bridge across the Detroit River.45 The bridge company’s claim is that 
several decisions made by the Canadian Government with respect to the bridge’s 
operation violate Article 1102 (national treatment), Article 1103 (most-favored 
nation treatment) and Article 1105 (minimum standard of treatment). This case 
has yet to be resolved. However, even if it were to be settled in favor of the 
claimant, the potential for impact on any significant public regulation remains 
unclear. 
In 2004, Cargill Incorporated, a U.S. corporation, filed a notice of arbitration 
against Mexico on behalf of itself and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Cargill de 
Mexico S.A. de C.V., a Mexican company46. Cargill claimed that its investments 
in high fructose corn syrup had been adversely impacted by Mexico’s 2002 
adoption of a tax on high fructose corn syrup. Cargill alleged that the tax was 
aimed at protecting Mexico’s domestic sugar producers and excluding high 
fructose corn syrup from the soft drink sweetener market, thus violating the 
national treatment obligation under Article 1102, the most-favored-nation 
obligation (Article 1103), the minimum standard of treatment obligation (Article 
1105), the prohibition on performance requirements in (Article 1106) and the 
expropriation obligation (Article 1110). Cargill sought damages in excess of 
$100 million and was awarded $77 million, later $96 million with interest, after a 
Canada-based arbitration panel ruled in Cargill’s favor in 2009. 
In that case, Mexico did not make the argument that its ability for sovereign, 
legitimate public regulation was compromised in appealing the decision or in 
appealing similar decisions by WTO panels against this discriminatory, 
protectionist tax.47 Essentially, Mexico defended its actions by citing the alleged 
failure of the United States to live up to its market access commitments for 
Mexican sugar under the NAFTA. This claim implicitly acknowledged 
discriminatory retaliation against a U.S. investor without even the pretense of 
justifying the tax as a public health regulation. In recent years, the United States 
has made several claims against Mexico for alleged sugar dumping, and Mexico 
has alleged U.S. corn syrup dumping into its domestic market. In that case, a 
U.S. investor bore the brunt of a broader bilateral trade dispute. Mexico never 
possessed the legal authority, such as that which could be bestowed by the WTO 
Agreement, to retaliate and the arbitration panel made its decision accordingly. 
The central theme across each of these cases is that arbitral tribunals made 
narrow decisions based on factual evidence. There are additional institutional 
checks in place to prevent abuses of power and provide meaningful recourse to 
dissatisfied parties. In fact, the author of this article could not identify a landmark 
case in which a major public regulation was effectively overturned due to a 
Chapter 11 tribunal’s ruling in favor of a claimant investor. 
 
 45 Detroit International Bridge Company v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2012-25, 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/354. 
 46 Cargill Inc. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/2, 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/ documents/1214. 
 47 Panel Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other Beverages, WT/DS308/
R (Oct. 7, 2005); Appellate Body Report, Mexico – Tax Measures on Soft Drinks and Other 
Beverages, WT/DS308/AB/R (6 March 2006). 
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Looking at all Chapter 11 cases together, there is also no apparent evidence 
that regulatory entities in NAFTA countries are prevented or deterred from 
adopting new or updated regulations that pursue legitimate public interests 
because of the risk of exposure to investment arbitration. Based on the cases 
decided to date, it is difficult to argue that regulatory effectiveness or quality has 
been appreciably diminished. Furthermore, as earlier described, even in cases 
where tribunals rule against a given NAFTA member, these tribunals can only 
force said member to pay fair, monetary compensation to the aggrieved investor 
rather than actually punish or otherwise compel a member state to reverse the 
policy in question. 
III. SUBSTANTIVE SAFEGUARDS IN PLACE AND NEEDED REFORMS 
In the original negotiations that established the NAFTA, a number of notable 
regulatory areas were both broadly and specifically exempted from the Chapter 
11 claims of foreign investors including national security, healthcare and social 
welfare, among many others. NAFTA Article 1101, the very first article of 
Chapter 11, immediately limits its scope in several key provisions. 48  For 
example: 
 
4. Nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from 
providing a service or performing a function such as law enforcement, 
correctional services, income security or insurance, social security or insurance, 
social welfare, public education, public training, health, and child care, in a 
manner that is not inconsistent with this Chapter.49 
 
Additionally, a full and lengthy list of exclusions and specially treated areas 
under Ch. 11 can be found in Annexes I through IV of the NAFTA.50 The 
creation of these exemptions demonstrates the negotiator’s original awareness of 
the risks for sovereignty and public regulation of an unchecked investor-state 
dispute resolution mechanism. Mexico reserved 89 sectors in its economy, the 
U.S. reserved 50, and Canada reserved 48, respectively. Other sectors that 
included significant reservations from national treatment and most-favored 
nation include transportation, energy, and legal services. In these areas and 
others, each country maintains a robust list of investment thresholds and 
screening mechanisms to shield sensitive subjects. 
In other substantive areas, like environmental protection, which were not 
originally offered as robust an exemption, it is fair to question whether the 
 
 48 For instance, NAFTA art. 1101 provides that a Party has the right to perform 
exclusively certain enumerated economic activities set out in Annex III; that Chapter 11 does 
not apply to measures adopted or maintained by a party to the extent that they are covered by 
NAFTA Chapter 14 on financial services; and that nothing in Chapter 11 shall be construed to 
prevent a party from providing a service or performing a function such as law enforcement, 
correctional services, income security or insurance, social security or insurance, social welfare, 
public education, public training, health, and child care. 
 49 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1101(4). 
 50 Id. at Annexes 1120.1, 1137.2, 1137.4 and 1138.2. 
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NAFTA strikes the right balance of regulatory autonomy and investor protection. 
The scope and scale of future exemptions should be adjusted to reflect the 
preferences and priorities of negotiating partners, while also ameliorating the 
concerns that multinational firms will have the power to trump national 
constitutions and sovereign authority. 
As ISDS is considered for inclusion in future trade agreements, negotiating 
parties should evaluate past allegations and evidence of disparate treatment of 
foreign investors. This evaluation should inform the creation of legal institutions 
that can accurately and consistently address these grievances. In tailoring these 
investor protections and dispute settlements, trade negotiators and political 
leaders should work to better define eligible “investment,” and clarify “fair and 
equitable treatment,” “indirect expropriation,” and “national treatment” among 
other key concepts in the NAFTA’s Chapter 11. Future negotiators should focus 
on deriving the appropriate lessons learned from the NAFTA experience in order 
to strengthen ISDS, and with it, international trade and investment. 
From the NAFTA Chapter 11 decisions, we observe a number of potential 
areas that might be strengthened or amended through both procedural and 
substantive reforms. Doing so could improve the NAFTA’s investment 
provisions while also serving as practical guidance for future trade agreements. 
On the procedural front, the NAFTA arbitration tribunals can become more 
transparent and accountable through greater, timelier public reporting and the 
fuller acceptance and consideration of amicus briefs filed by NGOs and other 
public interest groups. Creating more accessibility for all stakeholders could 
create another institutional safeguard to ensure the tribunals remain accountable 
and afford sovereign entities their prerogative for legitimate regulation in the 
public interest. The United States Trade Representative’s “Model Bilateral 
Investment Treaty,” released in 2012, makes good progress in laying out these 
improvements within investor-state treaties.51 
More can be done to see that non-meritorious cases are expeditiously 
dismissed and that the costs of cases do not unfairly disadvantage a lesser-
resourced party to a dispute. Similarly, because tribunals’ decisions do not 
constitute precedent, more can and should be done to alleviate confusion or 
undue compliance burdens when multiple decisions about the same investor 
protections are inconsistent in the future. 
Substantively, treaty parties must continue to evaluate the treatment of 
certain sensitive industries and economic sectors, ensuring that investor 
protections are appropriately balanced against legitimate public interest 
regulation. Notably, the aforementioned 2012 “Model BIT” strengthens 
standards for labor rights and environmental protection. 
IV. WHAT IS NEXT FOR ISDS IN NAFTA, FUTURE AGREEMENTS? 
Customary international law and the domestic law of each of the NAFTA 
parties should theoretically allow for each country to take regulatory action that 
 
 51 See U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, www.state.gov/documents/organization
/188371.pdf. 
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is in good faith. However, ongoing discriminatory regulation against foreign 
investors is an unfortunate reality. Well-tailored ISDS provisions are an 
important form of protection and recourse for foreign investors that have been 
unfairly treated. Clearly, addressing the claims of private actors becomes more 
challenging when this treatment is less overtly unfair and is shrouded in more 
noble intentions. 
The author’s conclusion is that while Chapter 11 cases thus far under 
NAFTA arbitration proceedings do not create a cause for concern, going 
forward, we must ensure that the legitimate interests of states applying public 
policy is honored. The real test is fundamentally whether public policies are 
applied to foreign and domestic enterprises in an equitable fashion. An 
appropriate analogy is the “Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine” of the U.S. 
Constitution, which has been understood to mean that states may not adopt 
regulations or taxes that place an undue burden on interstate commerce. As a 
general rule, U.S. states may not advantage their own businesses while excluding 
other businesses from other states. 
While Chapter 11 cases decided by the NAFTA arbitration so far do not 
create cause for concern, they do signal some weaknesses in the current 
provisions. State obligations and arbitration tribunals need more coherent and 
well-defined boundaries so that they strike an appropriate balance between 
investor protections that facilitate cross-border capital flows and the uninhibited 
role that sovereign regulators can and should play in protecting the environment, 
public health and the autonomy of their own legal systems. However, before 
dismissing Chapter 11 or future such provisions outright in free trade 
agreements, we should recognize their value in liberalizing investment and 
continue to evaluate the facts of these tribunals’ performance using a sober, cost-
benefit analysis. This analysis should inform practical reforms that address ISDS 
weaknesses while enhancing the ability of NAFTA tribunals and equivalent 
bodies to protect investors and create economic growth and development into the 
future. 
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